Precap: \u3cem\u3eUnited States v. Didier\u3c/em\u3e by Hamilton, Lucas
Montana Law Review Online
Volume 75 Article 15
11-10-2014
Precap: United States v. Didier
Lucas Hamilton
Alexander Blewett III School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr_online
This Oral Argument Preview is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Montana Law Review Online by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Lucas Hamilton, Oral Argument Preview, Precap: United States v. Didier, 75 Mont. L. Rev. Online 77,
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr_online/vol75/iss1/15.
2014 PRECAP: UNITED STATES V. DIDIER 77 
 
PRECAP: United States v. Didier 
 
Lucas Hamilton 
 
No. 13-30233 
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
 
Oral Argument: Monday, November 17, 2014 at 9:00 a.m. in the 
Portland Pioneer Courtroom, Portland, Oregon. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Simply because a statement is false or misleading does not 
automatically make it material.”1 For a defendant facing charges of mail 
fraud, the jury instruction on the element of materiality cuts both ways. 
Yes, you may have made some statements that were false or misleading, 
but that does not mean you are guilty—after all, your lies have to be 
material. The instruction entrusts the jury with picking which lies count 
and which lies do not. Any defendant relying on materiality argues from 
knee-deep in a hole dug with their own words.  
When Christin Didier, a former Miss Montana USA, was 
indicted on charges of mail fraud, the jury had to determine the 
materiality of her characterization of a “rustic”2 cabin as an expensive, 
expansive, mansion replacement. The jury found Didier guilty of mail 
fraud, but the district court set aside the verdict and granted her motion 
for acquittal, citing a lack of evidence in the government’s case proving 
materiality. The government has appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where the materiality of Didier’s lies and 
the ambiguity of her homeowner’s insurance policy will be the focal 
points of oral argument. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 
 
On January 27, 2008, Didier, moved out of her $1.1 million 
mansion in Somers, Montana. Built in 1903, the mansion had fourteen 
bedrooms, three bathrooms, and a ballroom. The property included 
nearly five acres of land with views of Flathead Lake. Didier, her 
                                         
1
 Opening Br. of the U.S., U.S. v. Didier, at *19 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2014) (No. 13-30233) (quoting 
from the “stock Ninth Circuit instruction”). 
2
 Id. at *23. 
3
 The facts presented here are drawn from the following documents: (1) Order, U.S. v. Didier, 2013 
WL 5524592, at **1–7 (D. Mont. Oct. 4, 2013) (No. CR 12-36-M-DWM).; (2) Opening Br. of the 
U.S., supra n. 1, at **19–21; and (3) Opening Br. of Def.-Appellee, U.S. v. Didier, at **6–13 (9th 
Cir. May 27, 2014) (No. 13-30233). 
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mother, and her “twenty to thirty Pugs”4 had lived in the mansion since 
2005, but the historic property was in dire need of repairs. A tornado 
damaged the mansion in July of 2007, and six months later, a fire left it 
uninhabitable. Didier lived in the fire-damaged mansion for more than 
two weeks while her insurer, Chubb Insurance, searched for temporary 
accommodations. 
Unfortunately for Chubb, no ordinary accommodations would 
do. When Didier purchased the mansion, she also bought a Chubb 
Masterpiece Policy with a nearly $1,000 per month price tag. For this 
steep premium, Chubb was obligated to cover the reasonable expenses 
necessary to maintain Didier’s “usual standard of living.”5 Chubb 
contracted with ALE Solutions, Inc., to search for accommodations that 
would match Didier’s standard of living. ALE recommended a fully 
furnished, eight-bedroom home, but Chubb’s adjuster rejected the 
$40,000 per month price tag. Chubb directed ALE to search for a 
property in the $10,000 to $15,000 per month price range. Eventually, 
ALE found a six-bedroom bed and breakfast in Whitefish, Montana, but 
Didier rejected it for being too far from home. 
On January 28, 2008, Didier told ALE she had a lead on a 
promising property in Rollins, Montana. Didier gave ALE contact 
information for Surayya Nasir, who claimed to be a broker for the Didier 
Family Trust, which owned the Rollins property. Didier proceeded to fill 
out a form for ALE in which she represented the property as a 6,900-
square-foot, five-bedroom, two-bathroom home with a $15,250 monthly 
rent, and $13,500 in one-time deposits and fees. For her part, Nasir 
claimed $10,875 in fees. ALE questioned Didier’s relationship to the 
property, but Didier claimed the property was held in trust by her 
extended family. After an email exchange between Didier and Chubb on 
January 31, 2008, Chubb’s adjuster approved the Rollins property to 
“shut this lady up.”6 
After Chubb began making payments on the Rollins property 
through ALE, Chubb’s investigators took a closer look at Didier’s claim. 
Chubb discovered the Rollins property was not the expansive home 
described on the form, but an 860-square-foot cabin with no indoor 
plumbing. Chubb’s investigators interviewed Didier twice, and Didier 
admitted she controlled the Didier Family Trust and thus owned the 
Rollins property.  
Based on these facts, Didier and Nasir were charged with mail 
fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud. Both defendants argued the 
evidence presented was insufficient to support conviction and moved for 
acquittal at the close of the government’s case. The district court 
reserved its decision on the motions until after the jury returned its 
                                         
4
 Order, U.S. v. Didier, supra n. 3, at *3. 
5
 Id. at *2. 
6
 Id. at *5. 
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verdict.7 On March 22, 2013, the jury found Didier and Nasir guilty on 
all counts. On October 4, 2013, the court granted both defendants’ 
motions, finding the government failed to prove Didier’s 
misrepresentations about the Rollins property were material—an 
essential element of mail fraud.8  
Central to the district court’s order to acquit was its conclusion 
that the policy language was ambiguous as a matter of law. To find a 
policy ambiguous, the court must read the policy “from the viewpoint of 
a layperson.”9 If a policy is ambiguous, courts will construe the language 
in favor of more liberal coverage.10 The court found the policy’s extra 
living expenses clause could be read in two ways: either it covered the 
actual costs of temporary housing, or it covered the cost of her “usual 
standard of living”11 in a mansion. Reading that language in a light most 
favorable to the insured, the only limit on the policy’s benefit was 
Didier’s standard of living, which Chubb had already expressed a 
willingness to value in the neighborhood of $15,000. Because Chubb 
ultimately paid approximately what it thought was reasonable for 
Didier’s standard of living, the actual value of the Rollins property and 
the fact that Didier owned it could not have been material to Chubb’s 
obligation to pay Didier.  
The district court explained its reasoning with a handful of 
hypothetical insurance scenarios. For example, if a policyholder has a 
fender-bender, sends her insurer quotes from three repair shops, but 
pockets the savings of actually repairing the car elsewhere, has she 
committed mail fraud? The district court answered no. By the district 
court’s reasoning, once the loss event occurs and coverage is not 
reasonably in dispute, the insurer is obligated to pay. If a policyholder 
makes false or misleading statements about a claim, but the statements 
do not substantially increase the insurer’s obligation to pay, the 
misrepresentations are immaterial. 
 
                                         
7
 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b) (reserving decision on motion for acquittal). 
8
 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2014) (mail fraud statute); Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999) (incorporating 
materiality as an element from the common-law).  
9
 Giacomelli v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 221 P.3d 666, 672 (Mont. 2009). 
10
 Id. 
11
 Order, U.S. v. Didier, supra n. 3, at *2. 
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III. ARGUMENTS FROM THE PARTIES’ BRIEFS 
 
A. Government’s Arguments on Appeal12 
 
1. The extra living expenses clause was not legally ambiguous, 
and if it was, the jury was adequately instructed to resolve the ambiguity. 
The government argues that the policy language, read in context, 
only obligated Chubb to pay if Didier’s reasonable living expenses went 
up. The government emphasizes the use of the word “increase”13 and the 
title of the “extra living expenses”14 clause, arguing that these terms 
clearly limit the policy’s coverage to actual increases in living expenses. 
Even if the policy was ambiguous, the government argues the 
jury was properly instructed to decide what the language meant. The 
district court gave the jury instructions about ambiguity in insurance 
policies, the parameters of deciding what the policy meant, and the 
meaning of materiality. In essence, the government argues that the court 
predicted the potential ambiguity and properly charged the jury with 
sorting out the policy language. Thus, the jury’s guilty verdict should 
stand.  
 
2. The district court’s reading of the policy language is not an 
acceptable interpretation. 
Assuming that the policy was ambiguous, the government still 
argues that the court’s interpretation of the language is inappropriate. 
While the court concluded that the “extra living expense”15 language 
conflicted with the promise to maintain Didier’s “usual standard of 
living,”16 the government argues that the two excerpts work in tandem to 
limit Didier’s coverage. If Didier incurred additional expenses by 
moving to a residence that maintained her standard of living, Chubb 
would be on the hook. However, if Didier chose to move into a small 
cabin with no plumbing, she incurred no increase in her living expenses 
and Chubb had no obligation to pay. The court’s interpretation of the 
policy, the government argues, was completely at odds with the plain 
language.  
 
3. The government introduced sufficient evidence to prove 
materiality. 
The government provided testimony from Chubb’s adjuster 
about the terms of Didier’s Chubb Masterpiece Policy. In ordering 
                                         
12
 All arguments come from Opening Br. of the U.S., supra n. 1. 
13
 Opening Br. of the U.S., supra n. 1, at *32. 
14
 Id. at *31. 
15
 Order, U.S. v. Didier, supra n. 3, at *10. 
16
 Id. 
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acquittal, the district court concluded the adjuster’s testimony simply 
proved that Chubb’s payments to Didier were in line with the policy’s 
ambiguous terms. On appeal, the government argues the adjuster’s 
testimony made clear Chubb would only pay for extra costs associated 
with temporary housing. Because Didier incurred no cost in moving into 
the cabin she owned, Chubb owed her nothing under the policy. Thus, 
the forms Didier embellished for the Rollins residence induced Chubb to 
pay more than it would have and the materiality element mail fraud was 
satisfied. 
 
B. Didier’s Arguments on Appeal17 
 
1. The extra living expenses clause was ambiguous. 
Didier insists that if Chubb intended the policy to be interpreted 
by the government’s view, the policy would simply state coverage 
extended to “the reasonable increase in your normal living expenses.”18 
Didier argues the added standard of living language makes the coverage 
more liberal, or alternatively, obscures Chubb’s real meaning. In the 
latter case, Didier argues the extra language makes the policy ambiguous 
and allows the district court to read it in favor of the policyholder.  
Didier also advances her argument at trial that carbon monoxide 
poisoning left her with extensive brain damage. The language of the 
insurance policy, already ambiguous in the eyes of the district court, 
would be all the more incomprehensible for someone in Didier’s mental 
state. Moreover, Didier argues her condition made it impossible to form 
the requisite intent to commit mail fraud. 
 
2. Didier’s description of the Rollins property was not material. 
By Didier’s reading of the policy, Chubb’s obligation to pay was 
tied not to Didier’s actual cost of temporary housing, but by her “usual 
standard of living”19 as it was in the Somers mansion. Thus, regardless of 
where Didier lived, the cost to Chubb remained the same. By the same 
reasoning, if Didier misrepresented the cabin’s size and amenities, her 
statements would only be material if it caused Chubb to pay more than 
what the company already reasonably owed. Didier contends she was 
free to “downgrade”20 and pocket the difference between the price of 
living in a mansion and living in a cabin. Because Chubb’s actual 
payments were in line with its obligations under the policy, Didier’s 
statements must not have been material.  
 
                                         
17
 All arguments come from Opening Br. of Def.-Appellee, supra n. 3. 
18
 Id. at *20. 
19
 Id. at **14–15. 
20
 Id. at *15. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
 
Didier’s argument on materiality relies on the Ninth Circuit 
either finding ambiguity in the policy language or concluding that its 
plain language means something other than Chubb’s “extra living 
expense” interpretation. After all, if Chubb’s interpretation is correct, it 
would owe Didier nothing. But by not even addressing the policy’s 
“reasonable increase” and “extra living expenses” language, Didier puts 
a lot of weight on the “usual standard of living” to keep her acquittal 
intact. While the “standard of living” phrase alone could be read as a 
blank check, the surrounding language places relatively clear boundaries 
on Chubb’s promise to pay. The Ninth Circuit would have to read the 
policy through a pinhole to agree with Didier’s interpretation. 
In arguing for the jury’s verdict to stand, the government leans 
heavily on the Chubb adjuster’s testimony on materiality. In its order, the 
district court notes the Chubb adjuster was not involved in the final 
decision to pay for the Rollins property. Instead, the adjuster’s supervisor 
gave final approval, and thus only the supervisor could testify about what 
facts were material in making that decision. Indeed, by the adjuster’s 
own unflattering words, he might have approved the Rollins property 
simply to “shut [Didier] up.”21 But even if the Ninth Circuit finds the 
government’s evidence on materiality on the slim side, it would be a 
stretch to uphold the acquittal solely on those grounds. Determining 
materiality is the province of the jury,22 and the district court provided 
thorough jury instructions on the issue. The jury apparently found the 
adjuster convincing, in spite of his dubious customer service.  
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit will pick which interpretation of 
the policy is more persuasive. On one hand, Chubb’s version requires it 
to pay only if Didier incurs actual increases in her living expenses. The 
jury apparently found this view compelling. On the other hand, Didier 
believes she is owed the reasonable value of her usual standard of living. 
The district court favored this reading. Because the policy has reasonably 
clear boundaries on coverage, the Ninth Circuit should be wary of 
Didier’s narrow interpretation. Any reading that opens the door to an 
insured’s creative massaging of facts risks disaster. Once a policyholder 
is willing to lie to her insurer, a thin, blurry line separates lies that count 
and lies that do not. 
 
 
Lower Court: United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula 
Division, No. CR 12–36–M–DWM; Honorable Donald W. Molloy, 
District Judge. 
                                         
21
 Order, U.S. v. Didier, supra n. 3, at *5. 
22
 U.S. v. Carpenter, 95 F.3d 773, 776 (9th Cir.1996). 
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